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Kurdish groups, both within Syria and throughout the Middle East, undoubtedly see 
the Syrian war as an opportunity to advance their goals of self-determination. The Kurdish 
autonomous region of Rojava is held up as proving the viability and necessity of Kurdish 
self-rule within any future Syria, with Kurdish leader Idris Nassan declaring that “federalism 
should be the future.”1 In addition, key events throughout the conflict were seized upon by 
Kurdish leaders in Turkey and Iraq to generate support for their causes. A strong Kurdish 
presence at the forefront of resistance to ISIS was used to leverage support from the EU and 
the United States for Kurdish goals.
2
 The PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) drew on its close 
relationship with Syria’s armed Kurdish group, the YPG (People’s Protection Units), to 
further increase its influence across the border. Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan 
2 
 
Region of Iraq and leader of the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party), claimed that the Syrian 
war, combined with the fight against ISIS, heralded an end to the “Sykes-Picot era” and 
called for a new map of the Middle East — one that would now include an independent, 
sovereign Kurdistan carved out of northern Iraq.
3
 According to Bengio, the turmoil and 
cracks in the Arab societies since 2011 are juxtaposed with “a growing tendency towards 
trans-border cooperation and unity” in the Kurdish case.4 Or so it seemed. 
On closer inspection, the Syrian conflict actually exacerbated already existing 
tensions within Kurdish groups. Clearly, at the grassroots level the suffering of Kurds in 
Syria generally increased the sense of shared kinship within Kurds living in neighbouring 
countries.
5
 But Brubaker argues, it is a mistake to think of ethnic groups as singular entities, 
and instead the internal organizational dynamics of an ethnic group need to be examined.
6
 In 
this case, increased transnational solidarity at the grassroots group level did not automatically 
translate into greater cooperation and harmony of tactics and goals at the level of Kurdish 
political elites. Instead, examining the internal dynamics reveals increased division at an elite 
level as competing political projects and struggles emerged across different Kurdish groups. 
The differences between Iraqi Kurdish leaders, on the one hand, and Turkish and 
Syrian Kurdish leaders, on the other, in their visions of the rightful future of Kurds in the 
Middle East has become increasingly stark since 2011. While in Iraq there were increased 
demands for independence, the calls were more modest in Turkey and Syria and appealed 
instead for federalism and autonomy. Turkey’s Kurdish leaders actually criticised Iraqi 
Kurdish demands for an independent state. Cemil Bayık, one of three members of the PKK 
executive council, warned against partitioning Iraq, declaring that it would strengthen ISIS, 
and therefore Kurds should be satisfied with autonomy within a unified Iraq.
7
 At the same 
time, the Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani demanded that Syrian Kurds throw in their lot 
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with other anti-Assad opposition groups rather than pressurizing the unity of Syria by looking 
for regional autonomy.
8
 
Rather than binding Kurds into some kind of mythical homogenous group, the war 
added momentum to related but distinct projects in each of the three states, thus increasing 
competition within and among these groups. As such, it would be a mistake to think of the 
Syrian war as inevitably advancing the idea of a unified Kurdish self-rule across the region. 
In many respects, it has hampered such aspirations by exposing the heterogeneity of the 
Kurdish population and the competing interests of different Kurdish leaders. While deepening 
connections between the PKK in Turkey and PYD (Democratic Union Party) in Syria are 
observable, the war exposed the competing interests and characteristics of the two distinct 
Kurdish projects of the PKK and KDP, the most powerful and influential Kurdish parties in 
the Middle East.  
Prior to outlining the impact of the Syrian war on pushes for Kurdish self-
determination, it is worth briefly outlining the relationship between different Kurdish groups 
prior to the outbreak of the conflict. 
 
RELATIONS BETWEEN KURDISH ELITES PRIOR TO SYRIAN CONFLICT 
Although our argument is that the Syrian conflict exacerbated intra-Kurdish divisions 
at the elite level, it should be noted that these tensions did not occur in a vacuum. Indeed, 
divisions between different Kurdish factions in the Middle East have a long history. A 
complete overview of this process is beyond the scope of the paper, however, to establish 
context it is worth briefly noting some of these more prominent divisions. Current divisions 
between rival Kurdish leaders were initially formed in the 1970s, with the proliferation of 
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Kurdish political groups and political agendas, notably the PKK
1
 in Turkey, the PUK
2
 
(Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) in Iraq, and Komala
3
 in Iran.
4
  Although each group focused 
on Kurds within their own state’s borders, the PKK in Turkey, and KDP5 and PUK in Iraq 
also engaged in activities across borders. 
 
The desire for control and influence across the region has been the key driver of 
tension between these groups, which has even led to intra-Kurdish armed conflict in the past. 
The most fragile of the relationships between Kurdish political parties at the regional level is 
the one between the PKK and KDP (and, to a somewhat lesser extent today, between the 
PKK and the PUK). The KDP’s alliance with the Turkish government is an important factor 
in this hostility. The PKK and KDP-PUK fought in 1992 when the Turkish army attacked 
PKK fighters in Iraq and the two Iraqi Kurdish parties gave support to the Turkish army. 
Additional rounds of clashes between the PKK and the Peshmerga took place in 1996 and 
2000. 
 
 There are also intra-state tensions between Kurdish parties, such as between KDP and 
PUK in Iraq (and, although not examined in this article, between the PDKI and Komala in 
                                                 
1
 PKK was established in 1978 in Turkey with a Marxist ideology and aimed at radically transforming the 
Kurdish society. The PKK’s initial goal was to establish a Kurdistan uniting all the Kurds across borders, but 
later it confined its goals democratisation and autonomy within each country. 
2
 The PUK was established in 1975 by Jalal Talabani and his close friends, who separated from the KDP. PUK 
is also a nationalist political party but is more open to a solution within Iraq and also has a more urban supporter 
base, especially in its initial years. 
3
 Komala is one of the oldest Kurdish parties, established in 1969, and was particularly influential in mid-1980. 
4
 There are several other Kurdish political parties in each of the four countries, such as KDP (Kurdistan 
Democratic Party – different from the KDP in Iraq), the Kurdistan Islamic Union in Iraq, Yekiti (Kurdish Union 
Party) and Azadi (Kurdistan Freedom Party) in Syria and HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) in Turkey. There 
also several active Kurdish diaspora organisations in Europe and the US. Most of the diaspora organisations 
have close ties with the regional parties. 
5
 KDP’s emergence goes back to 1940s when the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was established. It 
was formed as a branch of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran but later carried out its activities in Iraq to 
fight against the Iraqi regime and promote Kurdish national rights. The Barzani family is a key component of 
the party and its members today has influential roles in the party leadership 
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Iran). The KDP and PUK, the two main rival and equally powerful political parties in the 
Kurdistan region, also fought each other in mid-1990s over the leadership of Iraqi Kurds. A 
new Kurdish political party, Gorran (The Change Movement), joined the Iraqi Kurdish 
political field in 2009, formed by politicians that split from the PUK. Gorran achieved 
unexpected success in 2010 elections, and in 2015 Gorran and the PUK formed a bloc against 
the KDP. 
 
Intra-Kurdish rivalry manifests itself in efforts to influence and control Kurdish politics in 
neighbouring countries. Each of these Kurdish factions have established branches and formed 
affiliations in the neighbouring states. The PKK has particularly strong transnational links 
beyond Turkey through the KCK (Kurdistan Communities Union), an umbrella organisation 
of Kurdish parties affiliated with the PKK.
6
 Similarly, KDP and PUK have their own, albeit 
less institutionalised, affiliations across-borders.
7
 
 
It was against this at times fractious backdrop that tensions as a result of the Syrian 
conflict arose. One brief example highlights this point, namely how the PKK-KDP rivalry 
played out in Syria following the outbreak of the conflict. The KNC (Kurdish National 
Council in Syria), an organisation bringing together various Syrian Kurdish parties, was 
founded in 2011 with the direct support of the Iraqi KDP, with the aim of fighting against the 
Syrian regime. The Turkish state also supported the KNC. The PYD initially joined this 
group but later withdrew from it, instead coming to be seen as a closely related affiliate of the 
PKK. The PYD became the most effective Kurdish party in offering protection to the people 
in northern Syria and establishing autonomous control. Throughout this process, the KNC 
                                                 
6 PYD in Syria, PJAK (The Free Life Party of Kurdistan) in Iran and KDSP (The Kurdistan Democratic 
Solution Party) in Iraq are all members. 
7 Parties affiliated with the KDP are the PDKI, the KDPS (Kurdistan Democratic Party in Syria) and the KDPB 
(Kurdistan Democratic Party North) in Turkey. PUK’s allies are the KDPP (Kurdistan Democratic Progressive 
Party, Syria) and Komala (Iran). 
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became increasingly side-lined, much to the KDP’s and Turkey’s disappointment. In this 
way, the rivalry between the KNC and PYD in Syria is a layer of the regional PKK-KDP 
rivalry. It is to these wider regional dynamics following the conflict in Syria that we now 
turn.  
 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITY 
The Syrian war was perceived as an opportunity by Kurdish elites throughout the 
Middle East to advance their political projects and goals. It was also possible at times to 
detect increased harmonisation around the tactics used and in the alignments made by 
various Kurdish leaders. This is evident in increased demands for greater rights by Kurdish 
elites and by how they framed their struggle as a struggle for democratic rights. It is also 
evident in Kurdish leaders’ use of two key events: the siege of Kobani and the rescue of 
Yazidis from the Sinjar Mountains. These significant geopolitical changes brought to mind 
the questions of whether the historical tide was turning in favor of the Kurds and whether 
these developments could be considered stepping stones to new Kurdish autonomous 
regions or states, or even pan-Kurdish unity.
9
 
 
The Push for Rights 
Since the beginning of the uprisings in Syria, there have been significant changes in 
the political position and rights of Kurds in each state.
10
 The momentum spread throughout 
the region and was used to frame developments in relations with the governments of Turkey, 
Syria and Iraq. Kurdish party leaders in all three states consciously position themselves as 
democratic forces in order to attract international support, particularly from the United 
States and Europe. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has consistently argued that 
the Kurdish area outperforms the central government of Iraq in ensuring freedoms, 
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democratic governance, minority and religious rights, and gender equality. The Kurdish 
government adopts policies to show off their democratic credentials and often emphasize 
that remaining a part of Iraq hinders the Kurdistan region’s democratic, social and economic 
progress.
11
 They believe this legitimizes and strengthens Kurds’ autonomous status. 
A progressive rhetoric is also adopted by the PKK and HDP (People’s Democratic 
Party) in Turkey and the PYD in Syria. In the Turkish general elections in 2015, the HDP 
adopted an inclusive political agenda based on democratic freedoms, gender equality and 
environmentalism, and this expanded their electoral base in the June general election.
12
 The 
thinking was that an increase in democratic rights for all in Turkey would inevitably 
improve the position of the Kurds most of all. The HDP also practices gender equality, 
having adopted a gender-balanced co-leadership at all levels of party management. The 
same co-leadership principle has been adopted by the PYD, which presents itself as a 
pluralist and democratic party, inclusive of other Kurdish factions within Syria as well as 
different ethnic and religious groups.
13
 This is the result of its effort to increase its 
legitimacy among the population it controls and within international society.
14
   
Building on the notion that advancing the position of the Kurds was equivalent to 
advancing democratic principles, the Kurds in each state pushed for greater rights in the fall-
out from the Syrian conflict. When the war began, the Assad regime engaged in policies of 
goodwill toward the Kurds, including granting citizenship to thousands of stateless Kurds in 
Syria. It also refrained from direct confrontation. As the authority of the Syrian state 
collapsed, these policies became springboards for Kurds to carve out their de facto 
autonomy — an unprecedented development, considering the severe repression Kurds had 
experienced at the hands of the regime. Additionally, Kurdish leaders used the role of Kurds 
fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq as an example of resisting authoritarianism; they used this to 
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promote the idea that Kurdish liberation was synonymous with enhanced democratic rights 
in the Middle East.
15
 
In neighboring Turkey, official peace talks with the PKK had already begun in 
2009,
16
 but this process was given additional impetus with developments in the position of 
Kurds elsewhere, and in 2012 Turkey began official talks with the imprisoned leader of the 
PKK, Abdullah Öcalan. Through these talks, labeled as “democratic opening” by the 
Turkish government, additional linguistic and cultural rights were extended to its Kurdish 
population. Although Kurdish elites argued that these reforms did not address political 
demands and remained “cosmetic,” this initiative was a significant turn from the categorical 
denial of Kurdish rights throughout Turkish republican history.
17
 
In Iraq, Kurds pointed to the government’s inability to provide peace and stability 
and increased their demand for independent statehood and plans for holding a referendum.
18
 
Moreover, the KRG continued to sell crude oil to international markets, despite Baghdad’s 
opposition, based on the claim of a right to oil within their territory. The KRG also benefited 
from the vacuum created by ISIS’s attacks and the withdrawal of Iraqi military forces from 
the Kirkuk area, moving its Peshmerga forces into those areas. In this way, the discourse of 
self-determination and its associated rights was given further momentum relative to the 
state. 
 
Kurds at the Regional Level 
From the beginning of the conflict, some Kurdish political leaders engaged in 
unprecedented collaboration and solidarity was boosted at the community level. One of the 
most significant examples was seen in the siege of Kobani and its aftermath. The siege 
rapidly became a Kurdish historical milestone. When Kobani, a city on the Syrian-Turkish 
border, was besieged by ISIS in mid-2014, militants from the Kurdish YPG and YPJ 
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(Women’s Protection Units) joined together to resist the siege. The effects reverberated 
throughout the region, rallying Kurds from other states around the suffering of their co-
ethnics, especially Kurds in nearby southeast Turkey. The Central Executive Committee of 
the HDP called on international and local actors to help stop the violence and suffering. It 
also urged people to take to the streets, declaring, “From now on everywhere is Kobani.”19 
The government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq sent Peshmerga forces to Kobani 
with heavy weapons to aid in the fight. The Ankara government reluctantly gave permission 
for these forces to cross through Turkish territory while carrying arms, having initially 
denied the request and suggested the Free Syrian Army provide support instead. This was 
one of the rare occasions where Iraqi and Syrian Kurds (and possibly Turkish Kurds fighting 
as YPG militants) took up arms together. Moreover, the Kobani process led to the signing of 
an agreement among Syrian Kurdish parties and those close to the Kurdish government in 
Iraq, in which they agreed to cooperate militarily and politically against ISIS. Barzani 
welcomed the increased cooperation, declaring, “This agreement brings us together, and 
itself is a significant answer to enemies who did not intend the Kurds to be united.”20 These 
events were optimistically labeled by some Kurdish commentators as the starting point 
towards unification.
21
 
Greater Kurdish unity was also on display during efforts to repel ISIS from the Sinjar 
Mountains. Following a brutal massacre,
22
 at least 130,000 Yazidis had fled to Duhok and 
Erbil in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. PKK and YPG fighters, as well as some from Iranian 
Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan came to the aid of Yazidis, and later 
fought together with KDP and local Yazidi forces. In an acknowledgement of the 
contribution of these fighters to retaking Makhmour, where ISIS had a stronghold, Barzani 
visited the PKK camp in August to meet with senior commanders there.
23
 However, after the 
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defeat of ISIS, Kurdish groups fell into a bitter rivalry over the control of Sinjar, each flying 
its own battle flag.
24
 
As this brief summary shows, it would be a mistake to claim that the Syrian war did 
not result in any increased sense of kinship or cooperation whatsoever between Kurdish 
leaders in different countries. Kurdish leaders from all states used a rights-based discourse to 
try and advance their claims to self-determination and military cooperation was also evident 
by Kurds throughout the region. Yet ultimately, there were limits to the level of leadership 
harmonisation across the regions Kurds. 
 
MOVING FURTHER APART 
The opportunities for Kurds discussed above were high points that were not 
sustained. In fact, when you scratch the surface of this seeming rise in cooperation, the idea 
of greater pan-Kurdish harmony and coordination falls away. Instead, the fallout of the 
conflict in Syria has increased competition and schisms between different leadership 
factions across the region. 
Arguments assuming that the suffering and subsequent empowerment of Kurds in 
Syria would have a positive effect throughout the region overlook the pre-conditions in 
Syria, Iraq and Turkey at the time of the conflict’s onset. The capacity of each state was 
crucial in how it responded to increased Kurdish nationalism. The Syrian government and 
the federal government in Iraq are weak or in failure, but Turkey remains stronger. It has 
international support, a strong military and bureaucracy. Thus, the opportunity for Kurds to 
move closer to their goals in Syria and Iraq is greater, while Turkey has the capacity to 
protect its own security interests. This ultimately heightened intra-Kurdish tensions as their 
different political projects came into competition with each other. In addition, pre-existing 
relationships between groups mattered more than the increased sense of ethnic identity 
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produced by the conflict. This is evident in the way that different Kurdish groups have 
sought to frame the experiment of self-rule in Rojava and how it has led to widening and 
deepening divisions. 
 
State Capacity to Resist Diffusion of Kurdish Aspirations 
Pre-conditions in each state shaped how the Kurdish transnational dimension played 
out. The failed state of Syria offers a significant opportunity for Kurds. In Iraq, Kurdish 
leaders are locked in a long-term strategy aspiring to separatism; sectarianism and rise of 
ISIS limit what Baghdad can do to resist the increasing power of the Kurdistan Region. On 
the other hand, the Turkish state has the ability to restrict Kurdish leaders’ pursuits of greater 
self-determination, even if this quest may have been given added momentum by the Syrian 
war. 
The uprisings and conflict in Syria were a turning point for its Kurdish population. 
The weakening of the state’s authority presented opportunities to Kurds to pursue their 
interests. After the start of the war, the regime’s forces partly withdrew from northern Syria, 
leading many to believe a tacit agreement not to fight each other had been struck between 
the Kurds and Assad. But as the authority and capacity of the state came under sustained 
attack, this restricted Damascus’s ability to resist Kurdish progress towards self-rule or to 
strike bargains with the Kurds. By 2012, Kurds led by the PYD began taking control of 
territory they call Rojava or Western Kurdistan (see below for full discussion of significance 
of Rojava). Although Rojava is undoubtedly an important development, its position remains 
precarious.
25
 As the Assad regime gains leverage in the war against opposition groups, 
pressure on the YPG has increased.
26
 Moreover, the Syrian regime has not given up its full 
sovereignty in northern Syria. It has continued to pay the salaries of its public employees, 
and many Syrian state structures continue to receive their budgets from the government, 
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weakening the Kurdish authorities’ legitimacy.27 Rojava is far from consolidated as a 
political entity. 
In Iraq, however, Kurds have a more secure position, and the government in 
Baghdad struggles to contain their increasing assertiveness and growing power.
28
 The Kurds 
in Iraq have a long history of struggling to gain autonomy, and many believe they are on an 
inevitable path towards independence. Following Saddam Hussein’s brutal attacks after the 
1991 Gulf War, the United States intervened to create a no-fly zone over the 36th parallel, 
which led to the formation of a de facto autonomous Kurdish region. Since the 2003 
intervention, while internal conflict has destabilized Iraq, the Kurdistan Region has 
remained relatively safe and prosperous. It obtained its official autonomous regional status 
in 2005, two years after the Coalition Forces led by the United States intervened to depose 
Saddam Hussein. The next logical (and, many Kurdish leaders hope, inevitable) step is 
partition of the country and the emergence of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as an 
independent and fully recognized state. 
In fact, from the KRG’s perspective, the main threat to its stability is ongoing tension 
with Baghdad. The increasing weakness of the federal government and the rising 
sectarianism that is crippling the state have opened up the possibility of independence. In 
addition, a lack of budget transfers from Baghdad and the bad management of federal 
economic resources have put a heavy burden on the KRG’s ability to maintain satisfactory 
day-to-day governing.
29
 For Barzani and his KDP, the Syrian war, combined with ongoing 
sectarian violence in Iraq and the rise of ISIS, has offered an opportunity to realize formal 
independence. Barzani repeatedly stated his desire to hold a non-binding referendum on the 
issue.  
For Turkey, in some respects, the foundation of the state created the fault lines for 
the conflict with its Kurdish population. The Turkish state hinged on two core principles that 
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run through its security policy to this day: the state should be secular (a principle somewhat 
in flux under the ruling AKP) and unitary.
30
 The PKK, which was formed in 1978, emerged 
at the vanguard of a revival of Kurdish politics in the 1970s and began to carry out armed 
attacks against Turkish security forces in 1984.
31
 The response from the state, which quickly 
became the entrenched approach of successive governments, has been to confront the PKK 
militarily and to suppress and proscribe Kurdish political activism. This is not to say that 
there have been no attempts at rapprochement, but the militancy of the PKK and the limited 
concessions the state has been willing to offer have led to the failure of such attempts.
32
 
During the course of the Syrian conflict, Turkey continued its traditional state policy 
in relation to Kurdish nationalism: a military response combined with restrictions on 
Kurdish political activism. It is hardly surprising that this policy framework shaped the 
state’s response to transnational Kurdish developments emanating from Syria. The 
neighboring civil war, the changing political landscape in the region, and the PKK’s 
increasing influence in Rojava increased Turkey’s concerns over the Kurdish issue. 
Disgruntled by the de facto autonomy of Kurds in Syria and the possibilities this raised for 
its own Kurdish population and for enhancing the influence of the PKK, Turkey attempted 
to restrict the space for Kurdish activism within its borders. The Turkish state’s advantage in 
resisting Kurdish transnational influence was its powerful military, its NATO alliance and 
the PKK’s status as a terrorist organization.  
Attempts by Turkey to resist the Kurdish transnational dimension extended beyond 
its borders. Turkey remains deeply reluctant to see a continuous Kurdish belt along its 
border and has lobbied hard to restrict a self-governed Kurdish area from emerging in Syria 
in addition to the already existing one in northern Iraq. Ankara tried to increase its influence 
in northern Syria by calling for an intervention to carry out military operations, ostensibly 
against radical Islamists but, in effect, focused on the PKK and PYD.
33
 It also sought to 
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shape the Kurdish political landscape in Syria and used its leverage with Kurdish parties in 
Iraq to limit the possibilities for the PKK. Somewhat unexpectedly, Turkey has long found 
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq an acceptable political unit and viewed it with enthusiasm as a 
trading partner.
34
 Turkish acceptance of the region is further reinforced by the fact that a 
powerful KRG in Iraq poses a challenge to the PKK’s hegemony over Kurdish nationalism 
by offering an alternative source of leadership.
35
 However, there are ongoing Turkish 
concerns about the potential for such an autonomous region to inspire the push for 
independence within its own Kurdish population. 
In order for the KDP to realize its ambition of gradually moving towards separation 
and international recognition, it needs to reassure Turkey that this will not pose a threat to its 
territorial integrity. To do this, the KDP in Iraq strives to ensure that it does not upset 
Turkey. The KRG takes its decisions about relations with other Kurdish factions on 
Turkey’s terms.36 For example, the KRG needed Turkey’s approval to send its Peshmerga to 
Kobani. In order to not jeopardize its own relationship with Turkey, which it needs for its 
long-term plan for eventual separation, the KDP was lukewarm towards Rojava. Indeed the 
KDP almost implicitly adopted a stance that was closer to that of the Turkish government 
than that of Kurds in Syria and Turkey. 
The net result is that the different states’ capacities to resist Kurdish pushes for self-
determination increase intra-Kurdish tensions across the different leadership cohorts. While 
the PKK and PYD both adopt an approach of pursuing democratic confederalism within the 
existing states’ borders (with Syrian Kurds coming much closer to realising this than 
Turkey’s Kurds), Iraqi Kurdish leaders pursue a project of partition and independence.37  
Tensions arise when these projects come into opposition with each other. The KDP in Iraq 
attempts to rein in any political activity that the Turkish state may see as a threat to its 
territorial integrity, like a strong Rojava. Meanwhile Kurdish leaders in Turkey and Syria 
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have criticised attempts by Iraqi Kurds to seeking outright independence as destabilising the 
region, but in reality Turkey’s Kurdish leaders wish to see Abdullah Öcalan’s vision of 
Kurdish democratic confederalism as the political project that is pursued throughout the 
region. Their fear is that an independent Kurdistan carved out of northern Iraq would set 
back their own internal struggles. This also explains why it is possible to observe gains for 
Kurds within each state without actually seeing gains for Kurds overall across the region as 
a whole. 
 
Kurdish Factions’ Framing of Rojava 
Responses by different Kurdish factions throughout the Middle East to the 
emergence of Rojava also highlight how the ripples of the Syrian war led to intra-Kurdish 
discord at the elite level. Rojava disrupted the existing balance between these factions as 
they jockeyed to influence developments in the region in their own interests. Pre-existing 
divisions within Kurdish groups in Syria and attempts by Iraqi and Turkish Kurds to shape 
the decisions of Syrian Kurds ensured that the emergence of Rojava both enabled 
autonomous rule for Syria’s Kurds and increased competition among Kurds across the 
region. This battle of ideas over the meaning and significance of Rojava exposed the 
different interests of key Kurdish leaders. 
The starkest fault line within the Kurdish community in the Middle East is that 
between the KDP and the PKK, the two most powerful rivals for Kurdish regional 
leadership. Their rivalry has always been one of the key characteristics of Kurdish politics. 
Today the ideational aspect is also becoming prominent. The two groups have different 
visions for the future of the Kurds within each state as well as in the region as a whole and 
for how Kurds should govern themselves.  
16 
 
The emergence of Rojava served as a catalyst for making the division starker. 
Through the Syrian war, PYD was able to carve a zone of control in northern Syria and 
transform it into a de facto autonomous region. This was possible due to the existing cross-
border links between the PKK and the Syrian Kurds. The PKK has been developing 
transnational links with Kurds in Turkey’s neighbouring countries for decades.38 However, 
the emergence of Rojava, has not only made such links even more tangible, it also 
manifested Öcalan’s political ideology in practice as opposed to the Iraqi Kurdish model.  
The PYD tends to share the vision of the PKK, whose leaders strongly endorse the 
Rojava experiment and whose supporters hold it up as a living example of Öcalan’s notion 
of “democratic confederalism,” a system he proposed as a way to provide Kurds with self-
rule while still respecting existing borders.
39
 From this perspective, Rojava is seen as the 
beginning of the adoption and implementation of this governing system in other parts of the 
Middle East.
40
 Before Rojava, Öcalan’s ideology and system of democratic confederalism 
was just an idea that was limited to the way the PKK and its affiliated parties ran their 
affairs. However, the emergence of Rojava, its ability to survive for four years and, most 
important, its implementation of Öcalan’s governance principles, rendered the PKK’s 
ideology a reality. The PKK now offers a model that is bottom-up, decentralized and gender-
equal but also quite doctrinaire. It is a radical model and envisions a post-nation-state system 
in the Middle East both for the Kurds and other peoples. 
The KDP in Iraq, on the other hand, sticks to a more conventional nation-state 
formation route that emphasises self-determination of an ethnic group. It is similar to the 
Middle Eastern state model where authoritarianism, a centralised state, and tribal and 
economic elites are interlinked with the political elite. From this perspective, a major 
outcome of the Syrian conflict for the KDP was that it greatly increased the power of the 
PYD and the PKK to challenge their vision of what Kurdish self-rule should look like. No 
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longer is the Kurdish government in Iraq the automatic rallying point for Kurds looking for a 
governing figure or ruling spokesperson. Rojava increased the appeal of the PKK’s ideology 
among Kurds and sat uncomfortably next to the KDP model. Fault lines became entrenched. 
The playing out of these divisions between the KDP and the PKK can be seen in how both 
movements tried to influence the debate over Kurdish political parties in Syria during the 
course of the war. 
The transnational dimension was also about Kurds outside Syria trying to extend 
their influence inside, as well as the other way round. Myriad Kurdish political parties 
formed in Syria from the 1950s onwards. In fact, the Kurdish political scene in Syria until 
the start of the war was sharply divided into different camps, supported by either the Iraqi 
KDP, the Iraqi PUK or the Turkish PKK. As part of the battle for influence across the 
region, the KNC was formed in Syria in 2011 with the support of the Iraqi KDP, which 
argued that Syria’s Kurds should join the heterogeneous official opposition.41 The KNC also 
received endorsements from Arab opposition groups and the Turkish government. However, 
the PYD parted ways with it and emerged with a different understanding of the situation on 
the ground.
42
 Turkey, fearful of what this meant for its interests, put pressure on the PYD to 
remain part of the KNC and blamed the PYD for not cooperating.
43
 The PYD chose a third 
way, not taking part in the opposition or pro-Assad groups, and later pulling various like-
minded Kurdish groups under an umbrella organisation called TEV-DEM (Movement for 
Democratic Solidarity). 
Tensions among these parties continue today, reflecting wider tensions between the 
KDP and the PKK. The KNC argues that the PYD does not represent all the Kurds in Syria, 
and that the KNC should also be able to carry out activities and organize in Rojava. The 
KNC has also raised concerns about the intimidation and expulsion of critical voices, 
political activists and journalists from Rojava, revealing the battle for hegemony within 
18 
 
Syria’s Kurds, which in turn acts as a proxy battle for hegemony among Kurds across the 
Middle East. In fact, in wishing to advance their own push for independence while 
maintaining the support of Turkey, the KDP has urged caution around Rojava. This is the 
epitome of Barzani’s ambivalence, provoked by the Syrian conflict: a desire to use the 
opportunity to further his own long-term agenda of independence for Iraqi Kurds, while 
realizing this requires restricting the aspirations of other Kurdish groups. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The position of Kurds in the Middle East has changed significantly as a result of the 
conflict in Syria. Some of these changes have been profound, especially the emergence of 
Rojava as an autonomous region of Kurdish self-rule within Syria. Kurds have sought to use 
the conflict as an opportunity to push for greater rights within the states in which they reside 
and to frame themselves as being at the forefront of democracy in the Middle East. Some  
commentators in the region also expected (or in some cases feared) that the conflict would 
engender greater Kurdish unity and lead to a clear harmonization of Kurds throughout the 
Middle East around a unified push for greater self-rule. 
Such understandings, however, seem a little hasty when the trajectory of recent 
Kurdish politics is examined. Kurds have always been a remarkably heterogeneous group, 
and claims of the existence of a Kurdish people united by their ethnic identity have always 
been out of step with reality. The fallout from the Syrian war has highlighted the Kurds’ 
diversity and competing interests. While increased unity between the PKK and PYD is a by-
product of the conflict, the conflict in Syria also resulted in increasing division between Iraqi 
Kurds and their Turkish counterparts. What is more, the rise of Syrian Kurdish autonomous 
rule placed it on a collision course with Iraqi Kurdish desires for independence. Here, Iraqi 
19 
 
Kurds chose to criticize Syrian and Turkish Kurdish projects in an effort to advance their 
own aspirations.  
Where does this leave the Kurds after the fallout of the Syrian war? From a Kurdish 
perspective it may look like there have been some important gains within Syria and Iraq, but 
the future looks somewhat bleak. Not only is Rojava in Syria decidedly vulnerable; 
opportunities look sparse in Turkey too. The U.S. decision to side with Turkey in 2016 when 
Syrian Kurds attempted to cross the Euphrates
44
 is an important signal that the international 
community is more likely to choose Turkey’s interests over the aspirations of the Kurds. 
Turkish military intervention in Syria since mid-2016 and Turkey’s role in initiating a 
ceasefire and a process to end the war with Russia and Iran increased Turkey’s ability to 
shape outcomes on the ground. These will undoubtedly have impact on Rojava. What is 
more, the future of the Syrian regime does not look as hopeless as it did when Rojava was 
founded, so the will of Damascus is another factor the PYD will have to contend with. 
Inside Turkey, another period of military engagement has set in following the collapse of 
efforts at dialogue. Following the election in November 2015, the ruling AKP government 
found that tough security responses and playing up the Kurdish threat was a popular 
strategy. Perhaps the real winner here is Masoud Barzani, whose idea of gradual and 
structured separation from Iraq seems to be acceptable to the international community. This 
appears to have gained significant momentum during the period of the Syrian war and the 
associated conflict with ISIS, at least until recently. However, any victory for Barzani may 
well come at the cost of disappointing and alienating the Kurds in Turkey and Syria — and 
even the United States, whose ultimate aim is to keep Iraq united. As such, any short-term 
Kurdish victory may be mostly Pyrrhic. 
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